

Chancellor's Lectures 2010

Human nature, hope, and how to live now

Lecture Three, Tuesday 4 May

Welcome to the third of this year's Chancellor's lectures: *Human nature, hope, and how to live now*.

So far we've explored perspectives on human nature from philosophy, religion, literature and science. As I explained in my first lecture, I've taken this wide ranging approach partly out of impatience with the way academic disciplines have become closed worlds, not entering into communication or dialogue with one another. Opportunities to be enriched by the insight and wisdom of a variety of perspectives are thereby lost. But more than this, it strikes me, the 'closed worlds' situation is unhelpful to you and me, and society at large.

Unhelpful, because the job of integrating different perspectives is entirely left to us, the general public. We come across the insights of academics from books and television documentaries, and in the way their ideas feed into popular discourse through film or journalism or the internet – or even through politicians! And it's up to us to make some sort of sense of it all; to work out from all we see and hear and read, what is going on in the world, and how to make our own assessment of, say, the issues at the heart of Thursday's election: the economy, climate change, crime, social cohesion and the like.

I think we could do with a lot more help from our public intellectuals in 'making sense of it all'. I said in my opening lecture that it's a shame academics tend not to stray from their own disciplines – as long as when they do, they stray with humility. It's not much help if the main reason academics tackle another perspective is to rubbish or belittle it. Last week I genuinely tried to engage with Dawkins and Pinker on their own terms, with I hope a very different tone and approach to Dawkins's foray into religion, *The God Delusion*.

My own discipline is theology. I'm very aware of the danger to *theology* of operating in a closed world; or as Alastair McFadyen puts it, 'of withdrawing God to the margins of secular competence'. Theology should be about more than personal morality and spirituality, important as these are, for God is the creator of all that is, 'seen and unseen'. Theology, therefore, is (or should be) about discerning God's activity in the world, and drawing secular approaches into dialogue; both learning from secular thought, but also challenging the assumption

that God, and the religious traditions drawing their life from God, have nothing to contribute.

In this series the various perspectives I've explored have all focussed on what it means to be human. This evening I'm going to bring those perspectives to bear on a particular issue; to focus on a case study of that most disturbing aspect of our humanity: the propensity for violence and abuse that appears to part of (in William Golding's phrase) the 'bedrock of being human'. In Christian terms, we are in the territory covered by 'sin' and indeed 'original sin'. My intention is as ever ambitious: to test Christian teaching on sin in relation to the empirical reality of violence in the world. If the concept of sin cannot articulate, or help to make sense of, this reality, it becomes a meaningless abstraction. I will try to show this evening that in fact it has much to contribute.

We heard last week that Charles Darwin realised he couldn't prove the theory of evolution in the way Newton could prove the existence of gravity. Neither can you come up with a mathematical formula for original sin. Both Darwin and Augustine offer a general characterisation of what is really going on, a characterisation that stands or falls by its ability to make sense of concrete issues and situations.

The remainder of this lecture, therefore, falls into two parts. Firstly, I'm going to explore the concrete issue of child abuse, engaging with secular descriptions, and then testing the doctrine of sin in relation to this deeply uncomfortable territory.

Secondly, I'm going to compare and contrast Steven Pinker's evolutionary account of the roots of violence, with the work of the French cultural anthropologist Rene Girard. Girard finds in the Christian tradition the key to understanding the role of violence in the very bedrock of our culture.

In this first section on abuse, I am indebted to Alastair McFadyen's fine book *Bound to Sin – Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin*. It is a model of how to do the kind of interdisciplinary dialogue I have been talking about.

To begin by defining our terms. McFadyen offers the following definition:

Children are sexually abused when they are involved in sexual activity, are exposed to sexual stimuli, or are used as sexual stimuli, by anybody significantly older than they are.¹

¹ Alastair McFadyen (2000) *Bound to Sin – Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin* Cambridge: University Press, p59.

Abuse, he argues, should not be seen only in terms of an *act*, or *actions*. For when something is done, what happens is the establishment of a distorted and deeply damaging *relationship*. The consequences of such a destructive relationship are likely to last way beyond any physical trauma, as the child's sense of identity, and their wider relationships are themselves distorted and damaged. And while every situation is different, it's nonetheless possible to sketch out a number of recurrent features. The sources for identifying these, are works such as David Finkelhor's *Child Sexual Abuse: New Theory and Research* (1984) and *Child Abuse and Neglect: A Clinician's Handbook* by Hobbs, Hanks and Wynne (1993) From these, and many other books and case-studies, themes such as isolation, false normality and illusions of consent may be identified:

1. *Isolation*. If a child is surrounded by adults with an informed interest in their welfare, abuse is unlikely. Abusers either have to find a child who's already physically, psychologically or socially isolated; or to carefully prepare the ground by misleading or undermining the adults who are around. Physical isolation by itself is not enough; it may be another adult is dominated, misled or intimidated into silence, and the child threatened with severe penalties if tempted to disclose what's happened.

2. *False normality*. Because of the imbalance of power and knowledge, the abuser is often able to persuade the child that abuse is acceptable and normal. The abuse is built into a game, for example, or incorporated into washing or changing. Or the act is given a misleading and innocuous name, such as tickling or teasing. In these and other ways, the abuser distorts the child's understanding of what is going on, and their sense of normality.

3. *Illusions of consent*. Sometimes the abuser is able to convince the child that they have consented to what is going on, or are to blame for it. If the abuser offers emotional warmth to a child in a situation where they're usually deprived of it, the child may be persuaded the abuse is a trade-off for other benefits. The abuse may be carefully initiated by degrees, so that through small incremental changes it becomes unclear when a boundary has been crossed. If the child accepted what happened last time, why not this time? Or inducements such as money or sweets or given just before the abuse, implying to the child that a contract has been made.

Other recurrent themes identified in the literature are threats, powerlessness, betrayal, injunctions to secrecy, and the way the abuse becomes part of the child's evolving sense of identity. In keeping the abuse secret, the child centres much of their life and self-understanding around it. The abuser's ways of rationalizing the

abuse will usually communicate a negative sense of the child's worth, and an expectation of being publicly stigmatized or disgraced if the situation were ever to be disclosed.

Finally, the effect of the abuse is to distort the child's entire way of relating to others. The child becomes so accustomed to secrecy, for example, that they find any form of self-disclosure extremely difficult. Their sense of good and bad, normal and impermissible, has been warped, as has their sense of self-esteem, their handling of intimacy, and so on.

Everything I've said so far is based on the huge secular literature relating to child abuse. So how does the category of sin relate to the recurrent themes I've outlined, and can it offer any illumination? I don't mean at the level of 'abuse is wrong'; yes, of course – we don't need a Christian doctrine to tell us that; it's taken for granted by the secular literature and society at large. The kind of illumination I mean is explanatory power, something shown to us we hadn't previously seen.

Here I'm following McFadyen's work, in suggesting we should think about what the Christian understanding of sin says about the human *will*. If you heard my first lecture, you'll remember that Augustine and Pelagius argued about this. For Pelagius, perfection is within the grasp of all people, as long we choose to grasp it. For Augustine, sin runs deeper than this; it's an internal disorientation, affecting human beings at every level, not just in terms of what they do, but what they want; how they think, see, talk and choose. A dramatic way of putting this is found in the title of a book by Martin Luther: *On the Bondage of the Will*.

Take, for example, the paradox that many who abuse children, have a history of being abused themselves. Why on earth would anyone who's suffered in this way, choose to inflict the same suffering on someone else? For many abusers, their sense of identity has been so affected by their experiences, that despite themselves, they end up modeling their behaviour on those who abused *them*. 'I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing that I hate.' So wrote Paul in his letter to the Romans (7.15) and his words are precisely applicable here, as to so many situations. For many abusers do what they do not from a free exercise of their will, but from a distorted and damaged sense of intentionality and identity.

From a moral and legal perspective this does not, of course, excuse anything; but the perspective of sin goes beyond the legalities to reveal the depths of what is going on.

What about the ‘will’ of those who are abused? Because of the disparity in age, power and knowledge, it is impossible for a child ever to freely consent to abuse. But what happens to the child’s will, their capacity for willing something, through the experience of abuse?

Particularly because of the feminist perspective, it is now widely accepted that those who have experienced abuse should be referred to as ‘survivors’ rather than ‘victims’. This is partly because of a concern for how abused children will understand themselves and what happened to them, as they grow up into adolescence and adulthood. But ‘survivor’ also reflects the reality that an abused child is not only passive, not only ‘done to’. Their capacity to will something is not destroyed by what happens to them, otherwise they would not be *able* to recover and survive. What tends to happen, and here I quote McFadyen, is that ‘the will is not disabled, but disorientated in its operation.’²

What does this mean? Let me remind you of those recurrent features of abuse I set out earlier. The child’s willing may become incrementally habituated to abuse. Because by degrees the child has become confused about the difference between abusive and non-abusive acts, it becomes possible for them to will something abusive. Because the abuse may happen in the context of inducements such as money or emotional warmth, the wish for the benefits may become confused with the abuse itself. To repeat McFadyen’s point, the will is not *disabled*, but *disorientated*.

It is easy to talk about ‘free will’, but we learn from all this that the will is *not* always free. Your capacity to will is bound up with your history and experience. Your capacity to will cannot be separated out from your context and life-story. Once your will is bent or distorted in particular ways, this becomes part of your identity, and shapes your habitual manner of relating to the world. And while these reflections on ‘the bondage of the will’ arise out of the reality of child abuse, it’s plausible that they apply far more widely that.

It’s starting to seem as though what the doctrine of original sin says about the internal disorientation of the human person and the human will, may indeed have some explanatory power in relation to the empirical reality of abuse. It may also have something to say about the *healing* of such disorientation, not in avoiding all relationships as necessarily damaging, but in a search for ‘right relations’ – a community in which individual members are encouraged and empowered. Here, strangely, both Augustine and feminist writers on child abuse come close to saying

² McFadyen (2000) p125

the same thing, even if they differ on where such a community might be found.

For Augustine, the point of the Church is that it's a healing community formed by divine grace and the action of the Holy Spirit. The power to re-orientate our willing, so that we are spontaneously drawn to what is good and life-giving, is a gift of God channeled through his Church.

Many, perhaps most, of the secular authors on child abuse would not be happy with the notion of bringing God into it. For Augustine, however, the point of 'bringing God into it' was not abstract and theological, but practical and spiritual. How do human beings achieve rich, full lives, oriented in a manner that helps them to flourish and blossom? His answer is of a piece with his understanding of sin as broken relationship with God – healing, flourishing comes through *restored* relationship.

If Augustine was around today I suspect he would have some good questions for secular writers on abuse. What is that abuse an abuse *of*? What concept of the human good, or rightness, are you using when you identify certain behaviours as pathological? McFadyen argues that most secular writers have a fairly limited notion of the human good; something along the lines of normal physiological, emotional and social functioning. This matters, for two reasons:

1. A not very rich view of human flourishing, the human good, can fail to bring out the depth of what is being denied and distorted through abuse.
2. A not very rich view of human flourishing, the human good, can give those caught up in abuse a limited view of what they might hope for, and the resources available to them.

This question of what we might properly hope for is the subject of my fourth lecture. Sufficient to say for now that the Christian doctrine of sin places what is says about the disorientation of the child's will through abuse, within a larger context. From this perspective, amongst the many reasons abuse matters is that it threatens children's encounter with the kind of enriching, life-giving relationships that might have mediated to them the abundant life that flows from God. Abuse, says McFadyen, 'is abuse of the capacity for joy. Or, in theological terms, of worship.'

On that note and on that thought I conclude the first half of my lecture, in which I've attempted to engage with secular descriptions of child abuse, and then test the doctrine of sin in relation to these. I'm now going to move on to a second

contrasting of the secular and the theological, this time involving Steven Pinker and Rene Girard

Last week we met Steven Pinker, an evolutionary psychologist based at Harvard, and his book *The Blank Slate – the modern denial of human nature*. This book contains a chapter on violence, which begins with a quotation from Churchill:

The story of the human race is war. Except for brief and precarious interludes there has never been peace in the world; and long before history began murderous strife was universal and unending.

Pinker's argument is we need to *understand* violence if we are ever to *reduce* it. In this, he contends, we're hampered by a modern illusion – violence has nothing to do with human nature in itself, but is 'learned behaviour' from our culture. On this account violence comes from destructive external factors; perhaps poverty or discrimination, or could it be computer games and violent films? Those who argue this way see the problem as not ignorance about causes, rather a lack of application in dealing with these causes.

You will remember Pinker rejects the 'blank slate' and 'noble savage' approaches that would be reinforced if violence had no evolutionary or genetic origin. He is clear, however, that there are many reasons to believe 'violence is not literally a sickness or poisoning but part of our design.'³ He draws on a variety of evidence, from the prevalence of 'Chimpicide' amongst the primates genetically closest to us, to human history in general (he might have quoted Seamus Heaney's Nobel lecture – 'history is as instructive as an abattoir'). Pinker references a large study showing that toddlers are more violent than adolescents, with nearly half of both boys and girls engaging in hitting, biting and kicking. It's also true that our culture is fascinated by violence and murder – just look at the number of crime thrillers and murder mysteries on television and in the library.

Pinker sets out to 'disentangle the knot of biological and cultural causes that make violence so puzzling', starting with an examination of why violence sometimes pays off in personal or evolutionary terms. He finds a structure for his analysis in the work of the seventeenth century political philosophy Thomas Hobbes, who I referred to last week. Hobbes, you will recall, is the author of *Leviathan*, which argued for what he called 'the social contract' – the role of the state in containing human violence. The most famous quotation from *Leviathan* is that human life is 'solitary, nasty, brutish and short'. But this doesn't give us a sense of how subtle a

³ Steven Pinker (2002) *The Blank Slate – the modern denial of human nature* London: Penguin p314

thinker Hobbes really is. Consider part of the quotation Pinker uses:

...in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; the third, for reputation.

So let's examine these 'three principal causes of quarrel': *competition*, *diffidence* and *glory*.

You will remember from last week, in the section of my lecture on Darwin and Dawkins, that natural selection is powered by *competition*. Organisms, 'survival machines' in Dawkin's language, tend to disable or eliminate obstacles to what they need if they are to perpetuate themselves. For Pinker this applies both to individuals, and to countries. He quotes an analysis of 251 wars over the past two centuries which concludes that in most cases conflict was initiated by a nation concluding that invading another was in its national interest.

Pinker also takes on *gender imbalance* in relation to violence. He relates the violent propensity of males directly to our evolutionary inheritance, as follows: in strict biological terms, the role of men and women in reproduction have very different time scales attached. If you'll forgive the crudity of expression, a man's role in conception can be over in five minutes, while a women's role in bearing and rearing the child takes rather longer. For this reason the childbearing capacity of women is a scarce commodity over which males, especially young males, compete. And it is true that statistically, young men between 15 and 30 dominate any area of violence you care to name, from murder, to delinquency, to the structured violence of the armed forces.

The exercise of sympathy and compassion are of course also part of what it means to be human, but remember that those deemed worthy of sympathy often come from a narrow section of humanity; those who are 'one of us'.

So much for *competition*. What of *diffidence*? By this Hobbes meant distrust; a fear that others may want what you have. You therefore start to build up your armed forces in order to defend yourself. The trouble is, your neighbour may interpret you arming yourself not as self-defence, but as preparation for attack. The fear your fear now inspires in them, leads them to increase *their* firepower. This is known as the 'Hobbesian trap', whereby two countries intent only on defence can find themselves in a situation that escalates into war. Or young people in our inner cities start carrying knives, and grouping into gangs, because they're worried they'll be victimized if they don't. In both cases there is indeed safety in numbers,

but also a danger – not only of violence no one wants, but also that your neighbour may be so worried about being outnumbered, they form an alliance against you.

Our old friend self-deception makes yet another appearance here, as appearing stronger than you are through bluffing, is one way of avoiding an attack by your adversary. Since the most effective bluffer is one who believes his own bluff, self-deception can often play a part in war, often with disastrous results – as Barbara Tuchman has argued in *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam*. An updated version of her book should probably include Iraq.

Competition; diffidence or distrust; and finally, glory, or honour. According to Hobbes, people fight over ‘a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue.’ In 1969 El Salvador and Honduras fought a destructive war after a disputed match between their football teams. Medical staff and police report that injury and murder can result from the most apparently trivial things interpreted as insults or an absence of respect. We are also familiar with the notion of ‘honour killings’, when someone is deemed to have disgraced a family. And of how violence can be instigated out of a desire for revenge. Finally, Pinker argues that economic inequality is often a trigger for violence, as some young men compete for status on the only stage left open for them: the street.

His conclusion from all this is that violence cannot be written off as a primitive, irrational urge, but is rather the ‘near inevitable outcome of the dynamics of self-interested, rational social organisms’.⁴ Whether or not we accept this analysis, what can we do about it? Pinker is clear that the evolution of what we now refer to as the ‘rule of law’ through policing and an independent criminal justice system, are the most effective tools in reducing violence ever invented. Murder rates, to take just one example, now are a tiny fraction of what they were in the Middle Ages.

Pinker argues that what is also needed is a ‘rule of law’ to adjudicate between countries as well as individuals, but for some reason he doesn’t mention the United Nations. He ends his discussion of violence with two intriguing statements:

1. It would be far better to persuade people to give up violence to begin with, rather than punishing them after the fact.
2. Peacemakers struggle because they are dealing with mindsets evolved to deal with hostilities in the ancestral past, and we must bring this into the open if we’re to deal with it in the present.

⁴ Pinker (2002) p329

Human nature is the problem, he concludes, but understanding that human nature is also the solution. This applies, of course, to all manner of things, including the issue of child abuse we discussed earlier. But how are we to get people to give up violence? And how can we lay bare a mindset that has evolved in the ancestral past? Pinker doesn't say how we might persuade people to give up violence, but he has tried to say something about our evolutionary predisposition for violence.

Rene Girard has spent a life-time exploring such questions, and it's to his work I now turn. Girard is well known in his native France, where his work on the origins of violence makes the bestseller lists. For most of his teaching career, however, he worked in the United States, retiring from Stanford University in 1996. While there he held the wonderfully named post of 'Andrew B. Hammond Professor of Language, Literature and Civilisation'.

Girard's work is increasingly influential, offering a distinctive and original take on what the Bible and Christian tradition reveals about human beings. He describes his approach as an *anthropology*; that is a discourse about what it means to be human.

This anthropology begins with human *desire*, and its consequences. Desire, he argues, that is what we really want, is shaped by *imitating others*. Others offer to us 'models of desire', particularly those who might be described as heroes or role models. The logic of advertising, for example, is to make something desirable to us, by showing how much other people, especially celebrities, desire it. If people we admire and look up to like something, we are inclined to want it too.

This may sound innocent enough, but Girard's argument is that desire shaped by imitation (he calls this *mimesis*) nearly always results in conflict, and often in violence. The Bible, he says, unveils how this happens, and shows that God takes the side of the victims. The disciples end by imitating Christ, the victim who is raised from the dead, rather than the destructive desire of the crowd who call for his crucifixion.

Having given that quick summary of Girard's work, let's examine what he's saying in a little more detail, through a series of six questions and answers⁵:

1. *What is the chief characteristic of human beings?* Mimetic desire, or 'coveting'. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this; infants, for example, have their

⁵ Here I am indebted to James G. Williams foreword to Rene Girard (2001) *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning* New York: Orbis

parents as models of desire, and through them learn how to love and relate to the world. The tenth commandment, 'thou shalt not covet' witnesses to the more negative aspects of mimesis.

2. *How does mimetic desire lead to conflict and violence?* Because it leads to wanting what our model has, or being what our model is. If there are no brakes on our wants and desires, we become rivals to our models, or rivals to other people aspiring to the same thing as we are. According to Girard, it is the role of religion and culture to provide the brakes and limits, in analogous fashion to Hobbes' *Leviathan*. If a person or group feel blocked or prevented from getting what they want, whether this be prestige, power or property, frustration builds. If the blockages remain, eventually there is the need to express the frustration, to let off steam. Frustrated desire seeks somebody or something to blame, and the identified offender becomes the recipient of its anger. Girard calls this the 'single victim mechanism', and says it is an unconscious process; moreover from the Bible we discover that this blaming and victimisation is the work of Satan.

3. *What is the role of Satan in this process?* In the New Testament, Satan and the devil are interchangeable titles meaning the 'accuser'. The role of Satan is to name a substitute as the real cause of the community's troubles, ensuring the one so accused gets the blame. The real cause, we know, is mimetic desire, leading to a build up of frustration and then the identification of a victim who is weak or marginal enough to be expelled or eliminated. A perhaps too obvious example is the way immigrants sometimes become the focus of hostility for those frustrated by their inability to achieve the manner of life they want; the living standards proclaimed by a myriad advertisements and lifestyle programmes or magazines.

4. *What is role of sacrifice in Girard's thought?* Girard is convinced that human culture began with killing. In Goldings novel *The Inheritors*, referred to last week, we see an imaginative portrayal of this, as an early group of stone age *homo sapiens* use cohesion and co-operation to wipe out their Neanderthal rivals. In the book of Genesis, Cain commits the first murder, and also builds the first city. Genesis 22 offers the near sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham, before a goat is substituted. And if the victim is not to be killed or sacrificed, there is always expulsion. Leviticus 16 describes the transference of the sins of the people on to a goat, a scapegoat, which is then driven into the wilderness.

5. *How is the Bible unique?* Girard thinks that comparing sacred stories, including the myths of classical and ancient Near Eastern civilisations, is important. Christians, he argues, need not worry that their Scriptures will be reduced to just another myth, for all the similarities with other sacred stories. This is because the

Bible is unique in capturing the perspective not of the community doing the victimising, but of the victim. This perspective emerges in the Old Testament, particularly in the prophetic voices opposing sacrifice, and pre-eminently in the Gospels. The Gospel story does not unite the whole social order against the scapegoat, as other myths tend to do, but emerges from a dissenting minority. Moreover the central character, the one who heals, teaches, dies and rises again, is *innocent* of all accusations against him.

The Gospels centre around a classic situation of scapegoating and sacrifice, with *all* (for even the disciples have fled) against *one*. But here the ‘single victim mechanism’ is subverted and overcome, as the victim is seen to be innocent. When the disciples encounter Jesus risen from the dead, this is the starting point for a true conversion, a new knowledge of humanity. From this new starting point spreads a radically new notion – that a concern for victims is the absolute value that should be at the heart of all societies.

6. Sixthly, *On what basis is a concern for victims the new absolute value?* In the Bible this is seen in the Old Testament in the story of Joseph, the victimised brother who ends up as saviour of his starving family and people; as well as in the account of Moses, and the exodus of Hebrew slaves from Egypt. In the New Testament, Jesus proclaims a Kingdom in which the world of mimetic rivalries is overturned, and worldly assumptions about privilege and possessions are rejected. Jesus reaches out to those on the margins of society, and teaches his disciples not to expect power or prestige from following him. And when he dies, apparently just another innocent victim butchered by the powers that be, his resurrection reveals him as Lord, Messiah, instigating a new era in human history. The mechanisms of victimisation and scapegoating are no longer unconscious, but laid bare and exposed to the light. Intriguingly, Girard calls this victimisation a ‘violent contagion’ for which the resurrection offers a previously unavailable cure. People infected by this contagion are blind to their own illness, until they are enlightened by the cross and resurrection.

Girard’s final point is about the role of the Holy Spirit. Remember that the word Satan means ‘accuser’? In John’s Gospel the Holy Spirit is described as the Paraclete, *parakletos* in Greek, which means ‘defender of the accused’ or ‘lawyer for the defense.’ It is the role of the Spirit to continue the work of Jesus in bringing to light processes of victimisation, and to offer healing from this contagion. This connects with Augustine’s conception of the Church as a hospital of grace, in which healing is available as a gift of God. And in which not only is scapegoating revealed as illegitimate, but the desire for goodness is encouraged and enabled.

Pinker wonders how we might get people to give up violence. Here is one possibility, and I am not aware that he has a better.

I'm almost done – thank you for staying with me through some tough material. Next week I'll seek to draw together the threads of all that's been discussed over the last three weeks, and come to some conclusions about what it means to be human, what we can realistically hope for, and how we might live creatively today. Who knows, I might even say something about new year's resolutions! I will certainly cover a Church of England report on how our humanity is expressed in four key areas: money, sex, power and time. And do you remember McFadyen's comment about the human capacity for joy, and indeed for worship, as the measure of what our humanity is really about? More on this next time.

Thank you once again for your attendance and your attention.